Sistemas electorales y corrupción: Entre el estímulo y la disuasión

Translated title of the contribution: Electoral systems and corruption: Between incentives and dissuasion

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Abstract

This research note analyses the relationship between electoral systems and corruption. First, it discusses the different theoretical conceptions that are implicit in the explanation of which electoral systems generate incentives for political corruption. Particularly, it stresses the paradox that the same electoral systems that dissuade corruption are those that boost personalization and electoral spending. Finally, the theoretical deficiencies are illustrated with public opinion data from the 2006 and the 2008 LAPOP-Chile surveys.

Translated title of the contributionElectoral systems and corruption: Between incentives and dissuasion
Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)187-194
Number of pages8
JournalRevista de Ciencia Politica
Volume28
Issue number2
StatePublished - 2008
Externally publishedYes

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